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    This thesis examines the origins and implications of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) established in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  It analyzes the organization from the Chinese, Russian, and 
Central Asian states’ perspective.  Chinese and Russian motives for creating the SCO 
appear to have been threefold.  First, both sought an organization dedicated to providing 
security and stability to the Central Asian region.  Second, both wished to foster stronger 
economic ties with the oil and natural gas-rich former Soviet republics.  Finally, both 
favored stemming the influence of external powers, notably the United States.  The 
Central Asian states’ motives for joining the SCO emanate from security and economic 
needs.  The increase in the U.S. military presence in the region since October 2001 has 
drawn no response from the SCO.  Although some Russian politicians and military 
officers have criticized it, the governments of China and Russia seam to realize that the 
U.S. presence may help bring stability to the Central Asian region.  Many uncertainties 
burden the SCO’s future.  It may constitute another failed attempt to establish a security 
alliance or turn into a significant voice in international politics, especially with the 
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      This thesis examines the origins and implications of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization established in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan.  The objective is to look beyond its declared purposes and to gain a 
better understanding of its dynamics and potential significance for U.S. national security. 
      Professing concern for security in the Central Asian region, China and Russia 
have pushed for the development of a multilateral security organization “to protect and 
consolidate the peace, security, and stability of the region…and to promote the economic, 
social, and cultural development of the organization’s member states.”1 To what extent 
can the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meet the security, economic and 
political objectives of China and Russia in Central Asia?  Were assessments of security 
and stability requirements the key reasons China and Russia pressed for the creation of 
the organization, or did these two continental powers have other motives as they pushed 
for stronger ties with the resource-rich Central Asian states and as they watched the 
gradual increase in U.S. influence in the region? 
      The purposes of China and Russia in the creation of the SCO may differ greatly 
from those of the Central Asian states.  China and Russia expressed concerns about the 
instability in this region, including the risk of the region’s problems spilling across their 
borders; but will this security organization provide the stability in the region that China, 
Russia, and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia envision? 
      The fall of the Soviet empire in 1989-1991 and the subsequent establishment of 
the independent Central Asian states left a power vacuum in the former Soviet republics.  
Weak national governments eventually took the place of the Soviet rulers.  These newly 
formed governments were unable to effectively combat the growing problems of 
narcotics smuggling, separatism and terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalists.  
The Central Asian States were in desperate need of outside assistance in their struggle to 
stem these growing problems, and China and Russia could provide this aid. 
    
                                                 
1 Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service, Beijing, 
7 June 2002, from BBC Monitoring International Reports.   
1 
            In April 1996 China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan formed a 
security alliance in an attempt to bring stability to the border areas of the member states.  
This alliance was established to promote military cooperation and confidence building in 
the border areas of the member nations.  The main provision of the agreement states that 
“The military forces of the Parties deployed in the border area, as an integral part of the 
military forces of the Parties, shall not be used to attack another Party, conduct any 
military activity threatening the other Party and upsetting calm and stability in the border 
area.”2 In other words, the parties to this agreement concluded a non-aggression pact 
among themselves, but they did not accept any mutual defense obligation.  In subsequent 
agreements these nations have not accepted any additional security obligations; therefore, 
this group of nations, known as the SCO since June 2001, is not an alliance like NATO. 
      A further attempt at confidence building and cooperation by the five member 
states of the alliance took place in Moscow in April 1997, when they signed an agreement 
to reduce the number of armed forces stationed in the border areas.  This agreement 
reduced “military forces deployed near the border region in all five countries to defensive 
troops only.”3 This agreement is binding through the year 2020. 
      The alliance was not officially named the “Shanghai” Five until its meeting in 
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in July 2000.  In June 2001, the Shanghai Five became the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and added one more member, Uzbekistan.  
According to a June 2001 declaration, the main goals of the SCO are 
strengthening mutual confidence, friendship and goodneighborly relations 
between the participating states; encouraging effective cooperation 
between them in the political, trade-economic, scientific-technical, 
cultural, educational, energy, transportation, ecological and other areas; 
joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the 
region, to build a new democratic, just and rational political and economic 
international order.4 
 
                                                 
2 Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Areas, Article 1, 24 April 1996.  
Available at http//www.stimson.org/cbm/china/crplus.htm 
3 Guangcheng Xing, “China and Central Asia,” in Central Asian Security, ed. by Roy Allison and Lena 
Johnson (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 160. 
4 Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Paragraph 2, 15 June 2001, from 
the Daily News Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and 
Press Department.  
2 
      Since the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the 
subsequent U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the SCO has pushed ahead with plans for the 
creation of an anti-terrorist center, which the organization expects to be operational by 
January 2004, headquartered in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan.  The anti-terrorist 
center will be financed primarily by Russia and China.  “A preliminary agreement says 
that China will cover 32-38 per cent of the centre’s expenses.  Russia will provide for 
approximately the same amount.  Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
will make smaller contributions.”5 The center will also have a staff of approximately 
forty personnel.  “Bearing in mind that Russia and China make the largest contributions, 
most of the staff members will come from these countries.”6 
      In June 2002 the SCO approved the “Agreement Between the Member States of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure.”7  
However, according to a declaration by the heads of states of the SCO, “A clear-cut legal 
framework is thus created for the establishment at the regional level of practical 
interaction in the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism.”8 
      The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan has dramatically increased the U.S. presence in 
the Central Asian region.  What effect has this increase in the U.S. presence had on the 
SCO?  Since the war in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the SCO has been quiet.  
The organization’s members have developed their charter and have set forth plans for 
their anti-terrorist center, but have done little else.     
      As U.S. troops set up bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and U.S. military 
aircraft were granted emergency landing rights at airfields in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, 
Russia and China could not voice their opposition, as they risked being isolated from 
predominant trends in the global fight against terrorism.  In fact, Russia’s president, 
Vladimir Putin, offered his country’s resources and unwavering support to the United 
                                                 
5 “Russia, China to finance lion’s share of Kyrgyz-based antiterrorist centre,” from Interfax-AVN military 
news agency web site, Moscow, 26 December 2002.  BBC monitoring international reports, record 
#0F82C83BCC895D44.   
6 Ibid. 
7 Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 June 2002, 
from the Daily News Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and 
Press Department.   
8 Ibid. 
3 
States in the global fight against terrorism.  How long will this support from Russia last, 
especially as it watches U.S. economic aid pour into former Soviet republics in order to 
develop alternate routes for oil and natural gas shipments and to aid in the re-building of 
those nations’ armed forces? 
4 
II. THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
      After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly elected Central Asian 
leaders were hesitant to break ties with Moscow because of the economic 
interdependence between the former Soviet republics and Russia, plus the regional 
security provided by Russian troops.  Moscow, however, overestimated the strength of 
these ties to the former Soviet republics.  The Russians believed “that geographic 
location, shared history, common production systems, infrastructure and institutions, and 
old dependences on Russian financial subsidies and on the Russian market”9 would keep 
the former Soviet republics in Central Asia interested in maintaining close ties with 
Moscow. 
      This overestimation soon became clear as the former Soviet republics began 
distancing themselves from Moscow in the mid-1990s.  Two important events help to 
explain the decline in Russia’s influence in the former Soviet republics.  The first event 
was Russia’s initial war in Chechnya, 1994-96.  The once powerful Russian military was 
unable to defeat an inferior rebel force despite boasting an enormous technological and 
resource advantage.  This costly defeat highlighted the deteriorating state of the Russian 
military and cast doubts in the minds of the Central Asian leaders as to how effective 
Russia would be in providing security in the region.  
      The second event was the collapse of the Russian economy in 1998. The collapse 
had a resounding effect throughout the Central Asian states, whose economies were still 
closely tied to the Russian economy.  This economic collapse meant Russia would be 
unable to provide the former Soviet republics with the monetary aid needed to further 
develop their economic and security infrastructure.  The economic collapse and the 
deteriorating state of the Russian military pushed the Central Asian states away from 
Moscow and in search of their own identities as well as other sources of economic and 
security support. 
      When the current Russian president, Vladimir Putin, took office on an acting basis 
on 31 December 1999, Russia’s influence in the Central Asian region had severely 
                                                 
9 Lena Johnson, “Russia and Central Asia,” in Central Asian Security, ed. by Roy Allison and Lena 
Johnson (Washington, DC:  Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 96. 
5 
diminished.  Russia’s closest ally in the region by the year 2000 was Tajikistan, the 
weakest of the former Soviet republics.  The strongest nation in the region, Uzbekistan, 
was the most outspoken critic of Russia’s policies in Central Asia.  Attempts at collective 
security agreements within the region, specifically the Commonwealth of Independent 
States Collective Security Treaty, failed to materialize as Russia envisioned. 
      Russia viewed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Treaty on 
Collective Security as an attempt to provide security and stability to the participating 
former Soviet republics.  The treaty was signed by six of the former Soviet republics in 
1992:  Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  Article 
Four of the CIS Treaty on Collective Security delineates the collective defense 
obligation. 
If one of the participating states is subjected to aggression by any state or 
group of states, this will be perceived as aggression against all 
participating states to this treaty.  In the event of an act of aggression 
being committed against any of the participating states, all the other 
participating states will give it the necessary assistance, including military 
assistance, and will also give support with the means at their disposal by 
way of exercising the right to collective defense in accordance with article 
51 of the UN Charter.10 
 
      However, while Russia viewed this treaty as creating a secure and stable 
periphery, several other former Soviet republics viewed it differently.  Although other 
countries adhered to it (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Uzbekistan), Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Uzbekistan “decided to end their participation in the collective military 
cooperation framework because the treaty provided no actual protection of its members 
security, rather it has more to do with extending Russia’s interests.”11 Moreover, six 
former Soviet republics never adhered to the CIS Collective Security Treaty:  Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.     
      At the start of his time in office President Putin began warning about the dangers 
of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.  These warnings, which concerned key security 
dilemmas in Central Asia, drew favorable responses from Central Asian leaders.  As 
                                                 
10 “Treaty on CIS Collective Security Published,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 23 May 1992, First 
Edition, pp. 2.  From FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992. 
11 Dimitri Kemoklidze, “Has the Commonwealth of Independent States Collapsed?” From Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst, Johnson’s Russia List #5012, 8 January 2001.  Available at 
http//www.cdi.org/Russia/Johnson/5012.html 
6 
President Putin was warning about the dangers of terrorism, the Russian military was 
demonstrating its ability to provide anti-terror support to Central Asian leaders.  A large 
scale military exercise, Commonwealth Southern Shield 2000, involving “about 10,000 
Russian, Tajik, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops … specifically rehearsed an anti-
terrorist operation.”12 This large scale exercise demonstrated that Russia still maintained 
the ability to project power in the Central Asian region and helped to reassure Central 
Asian leaders that Russia could be counted on to provide anti-terrorism support when 
needed. 
A. RUSSIA’S POLITICAL MOTIVES WITHIN THE SCO  
      Vladimir Putin’s pragmatic approach to Central Asian relations and the creation 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have effectively strengthened Russia’s 
influence in the former Soviet republics.  By aligning itself with China and the four 
Central Asian states in the SCO, Russia may also be seeking a tool to counter U.S. 
influence in the region and to hold China in check.  Politically, the creation of the SCO 
has not only given Russia a “Trojan horse” to exert influence in the region it controlled 
for over one hundred years (1865-1991), 13 but it could also allow Russia to achieve two 
of its long-standing foreign policy goals in Central Asia:  “to integrate the Central Asian 
states in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] sphere and make them into 
close allies and…to deny external powers strategic access to Central Asia.”14 It is 
obvious, however, that China is an “external power” that gains “strategic access” to 
Central Asia via the SCO. 
      In the SCO, Russia and China have found a common forum in which to air their 
anti-U.S. sentiments and voice their opposition to U.S. policies.  Russia has backed 
China’s position that Taiwan is an integral part of China and not an independent nation.  
Until the United States announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 
2001 (a withdrawal that took effect in June 2002), Russia also used the SCO to underline 
                                                 
12 Roland Dannreuther “Russia’s Eurasian Security Policy,” Joint Workshop on Europe and Transatlantic 
Security:  Issues and Perspectives, from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.  Available at 
http//www.gcsp.ch/e/research/Kandersteg/Papers/Dannreuther.htm 
13 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia (New York:  New York University Press, 2000), pp.  25-33. 
Although the Russians began expanding their rule into this region in 1854 after their defeat in the Crimean 
war, the borders of the present states were not established until the 1920s under the USSR. 
14 The NATO-Russia Archive, “Russia and Central Asia,”  Available at 
http//www.bits.de/NRANEU/CentralAsia.html 
7 
its opposition to the U.S. missile defense system by emphasizing the need to strictly abide 
by the 1972 ABM treaty. 
      Russia has also used the SCO to assert the need for a “multi-polar” structure in 
global politics.  A June 2002 declaration of the heads of state of the SCO proclaimed:  
“The SCO member states build their relations within the framework of an emerging 
multipolar system of international relations and believe that world order in the 21st 
century should be based on mechanisms for the collective solution of key problems.”15 
This provision of the SCO declaration is consistent with one of the general principles of 
the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed 28 June 2000.  That 
provision identifies the United States as the hegemon in a unipolar international order:  
“There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world 
with the economic and power domination of the United States.”16 
B. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC NEEDS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
      The economic potential of the Central Asian states is perhaps the main catalyst of 
the power competition between China, Russia and the United States in the region.  The 
Central Asian region, including the Caspian Sea basin, is second only to the Persian Gulf 
area in known energy resources.  The five Central Asian states (including Turkmenistan) 
possess roughly 4 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves and over 6.6 billion barrels 
of proven oil reserves.17 Kazakhstan, the region’s largest oil producer, extracts over 
811,000 barrels of oil per day.18 
      The lack of alternative export routes for Central Asian oil and natural gas has 
allowed Russia to maintain control over the region’s energy resources.  To reach the 
world markets Central Asian oil and gas must be shipped through pipelines on Russian 
soil.  However, as foreign aid and investment, most notably from the United States, pour 
into the region, alternative routes, i.e. alternate pipelines, are being developed in order to 
                                                 
15 Declaration by the Heads of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 June 2002, 
from The Daily News Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information 
and Press Department.   
16 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000, from the NATO-Russia Archive-
Russia and Central Asia.  Available at http//www.bits.de/NRANEU/CentralAsia.html 




bypass the heavily taxed Russian pipelines.  If these alternative routes are established, 
Russia stands to lose a large amount of yearly revenue and significant political leverage. 
      One example of Russia’s control over Central Asian energy resources is the 
domination of the natural gas resources in the region by Gazprom, Russia’s state-run 
natural gas company. Gazprom maintains a monopoly over Russian and Central Asian 
natural gas export pipelines.  This company produces roughly 94 percent of Russia’s 
natural gas and holds about one third of the world’s natural gas reserves.19 Gazprom 
controls all the natural gas pipelines throughout Russia and into Central Asia.  Because of 
this monopoly, Gazprom has become Russia’s largest earner of hard currency and 
accounts for 25 percent of the Russian government’s tax revenue.20  
      Although Russia possesses its own vast quantities of proven oil reserves, 48.6 
billion barrels, and the world’s largest natural gas reserves, Central Asian oil and gas 
reach the world markets as Russian exports.21  The combination of Russia’s own oil and 
natural gas reserves and the oil and natural gas it transports from the Central Asian states 
has made Russia the world’s largest natural gas exporter and the world’s second largest 
oil exporter, behind Saudi Arabia.22 
      However, Russia’s monopoly over oil and natural gas export routes from Central 
Asia is coming to an end.  The Central Asian states have begun to develop alternative 
export routes, namely alternate oil and gas pipelines.  By developing these alternate 
pipelines, the Central Asian states can bypass the heavily taxed Russian pipelines and 
export their energy resources at world market prices instead of the prices they currently 
receive from Russia. 
      Through the structure of the SCO, Russia and China are competing with the West, 
most notably the United States, for the development and export of Central Asian natural 
energy.  According to the Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, on 7 
June 2002, “developing the economic partnership is a particularly important task in the 
activities of the SCO…In the nearest future it is necessary to determine priority projects 
                                                 






for practical cooperation in such areas as the construction of transport communications 
and power supply projects, water use, the extraction and transportation of energy 
resources, as well as in other fields of mutual interest.”23 This pledge by the organization 
gives Russia and China an added advantage over their Western competitors, but it by no 
means ensures that Moscow and Beijing will attain a monopoly over access to Central 
Asian natural resources.   
      One potential crisis that could evolve within the SCO is a rivalry between Russia 
and China over the energy resources in the Central Asian region. As China’s economy 
continues to grow and its energy consumption continues to rise, it will require more 
sources of energy to meet its growing demands.  Russia will also require more sources of 
energy in the coming years as its official strategy through 2020 will be “to position itself 
as a leader in the world’s energy markets,”24 as declared by Russia’s Energy Minister, 
Igor Yusufov, in May 2002.         
      Russia has continued to increase its yearly oil output.  This has resulted in 
Russia’s oil production exceeding the development and discovery of new oil fields.  
Indeed, Russia’s largest oil fields in Siberia are being depleted.  The depletion of these oil 
fields will eventually cause a severe decrease in Russian oil output.  Russia will then 
probably begin to rely on Central Asian oil as it focuses on discovering and developing 
new oil fields within Russia.   
      The largest impediment keeping Russia from exploiting Central Asian oil through 
the SCO is its lack of ability to provide economic backing for the development of the 
region’s oil and natural gas facilities, including new export routes.  However, by forming 
an alliance with the Central Asian states and China, Russia has paved the way for 
stronger economic ties with the Central Asian region.  This may enhance Russia’s 
opportunities to exploit Central Asian energy resources.  Without the SCO Russia would 
have to compete alone against Western nations, notably the United States, for Central 
Asian oil and natural gas, something Russia is financially ill-equipped to do. 
 
                                                 
23 Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 June 2002.  
From the Daily News Bulletin from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information 
and Press Department.    
24 Igor Yusufov quoted in Sergei Blagov, “Russia Looks East and West for Energy Resources,” 30 May 
2002, from EURASIANET.org/departments/business/articles/eav053002.shtml 
10 
C.  RUSSIAN SECURITY CONCERNS 
      One of the chief reasons Russia pushed for the creation of the SCO was fear of the 
instability in the Central Asian region spilling across Russia’s porous southern borders.  
Russia’s southern regions are impoverished and ethnically diverse.  The lack of an 
adequate number of border guards to patrol Russia’s 16,762 km southern border and the 
severe corruption among key officials in the region and among the border guards 
themselves contribute to the growing problems of narcotics trafficking and illegal 
immigration.25 It has been estimated that nearly 70 percent of the narcotics flow through 
Russia’s southern border passes through a border guard checkpoint.26  
      The poverty, corruption and lack of government resources to combat these 
problems make Russia’s southern regions susceptible to separatism and the spread of 
radical Islam.  The republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in southern Russia pose the 
greatest fears for Russian officials. These two autonomous republics are the most diverse 
regions within Russia, ethnically and religiously, with large Muslim majorities in both 
republics. 
      The fear of Islamic fanaticism spreading to these two republics was addressed by 
Supreme Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin, head of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of 
the European Part of Russia and Siberia.  In April 2001 he stated, “The situation is quite 
alarming and adverse in Orenburg and Ulyanovsk regions, Tatarstan and Mordovia.  The 
extremism, fanaticism, and varieties of Wahhabism there are attempting to acquire a wide 
field of activity.”27 In December 1999 an explosion destroyed a section of a gas pipeline 
in Kirovskaya Oblast near Tatarstan.  The police detained twelve individuals with ties to 
the bombing, including individuals from Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.28     
      These security concerns were probably among the main driving forces behind 
Russia backing China in the creation of the SCO.  Through this organization Russia could 
                                                 
25 Robert Orttung “Russia’s Southern Regions:  Threats and Opportunities,” from the Policy Brief of the 
EastWest Institute.  Available at http//psp.iews.org 
26 Ibid. 
27 Tadzhuddin in Izvestiya, 27 April 2001, quoted in Mark A. Smith, Russia & Islam, F73 (Camberley, 
England: Conflict Studies Research Center, August 2001), p. 9.  Available at http//www.csrc.ac.uk 
28  Mark A. Smith, Russia & Islam, F73 (Camberley, England: Conflict Studies Research Center, August 
2001), p. 9.  Available at http//www.csrc.ac.uk 
 
11 
work with its southern neighbors to stem these growing problems and create a stable 
buffer zone between Russia’s southern regions and the growing problem of radical Islam 
in Central Asia.  Russia articulated this priority in its Foreign Policy Concept in June 
2000:  “To form a good-neighbor belt along the perimeter of Russia’s borders, to 
promote elimination of the existing and prevent the emergence of potential hotbeds of 
tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the Russian Federation.”29   
      Another Central Asian security concern for Russia has been how to provide 
security for ethnic Russians still residing in the former Soviet republics.  The break-up of 
the Soviet Union left large numbers of ethnic Russians citizens of newly formed nations.  
Through the 1990s a major portion of the ethnic Russians in the Central Asian states 
migrated back to Russia, but there still remains a considerable number of ethnic Russians 
in the former Soviet republics, notably in Kazakhstan where Russians make up 30% of 
the population.30        
      The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept addresses the issue of ethnic 
Russians living abroad by stating that one of the main objectives of Russia’s foreign 
policy is “To uphold in every possible way the rights and interests of Russian citizens and 
fellow countrymen abroad.”31 The SCO may enable Russia to protect the rights and 
interests of Russian citizens in the Central Asian states by working with these 
governments to eliminate the instability which threatens Russian citizens and/or ethnic 
Russians residing in the Central Asian region.  Also, by working through the 
organization, Russia’s actions would not be viewed with suspicion by Central Asian 
leaders, in contrast with Moscow’s Central Asian policy in the early 1990s. 
D. CONCLUSION 
      Russia hopes that the cooperation of the six member states of the SCO in 
combating illegal activities in the Central Asian region will stem the spread of radical 
Islam and separatism through Russia’s southern regions.  This might help prevent a 
situation similar to the ongoing Chechen campaign for independence.  Russia is also 
                                                 
29 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000, from the NATO-Russia Archive-
Russia and Central Asia.  Available at http//www.bits.de/NRANEU/CentralAsia.html 
30 The CIA World Factbook 2002.  Available at http//www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
31 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 28 June 2000, from the NATO-Russia Archive-
Russia and Central Asia.  Available at http//www.bits.de/NRANEU/CentralAsia.html 
12 
optimistic that cooperation within the organization will help to curtail narcotics 
smuggling and illegal immigration.  
      Russia’s vision of providing security and stability in the former Soviet space 
through the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty has been 
slow to materialize.  Therefore, Russia has been interested in establishing an organization 
that would encompass all the Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, which had 
dropped out of the Collective Security Treaty.   
     The economic benefits in the form of Central Asian oil and natural gas, which 
Russia hopes to attain through the SCO, could add a tremendous boost to Russia’s weak 
economy.  Russia’s monopoly over natural gas and oil export routes has allowed Russia 
to exert some control over the former Soviet republics in Central Asia.  However, 
Russia’s inability to provide the financial resources needed to develop the region’s oil 
and natural gas fields and to develop new export routes has pushed the Central Asian 
states away from Russia and towards Western nations, notably the United States.   
      The SCO has the potential to change Russia’s economic direction in Central Asia 
and to strengthen Russia’s political influence throughout the region.  As long as President 
Putin continues to maintain friendly ties with China, bilaterally and through the SCO, and 
with the West, specifically NATO countries (the United States above all), the SCO has 
the potential to provide Russia with the political, economic and security benefits that 






























III. THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
      As the main catalyst for the establishment of the SCO, China evidently pursued 
the creation of the organization for three primary reasons.  First, the SCO has given 
China another tool to combat the Uighur separatists in the Xinjiang autonomous region as 
well as to satisfy security concerns on its western borders.  Second, despite the reiteration 
by the members of the SCO that the organization “is neither a bloc nor a closed alliance, 
[and] is not directed against any individual countries or groups of states,”32 the SCO has 
given China a vehicle in which to push its anti-U.S. views, to counter what it sees as U.S. 
hegemony in the region, and potentially to rival the U.S.-led NATO alliance.  China’s 
third motive for the creation of the SCO appears to have been its desire for stronger 
economic and trade ties and the development and export of Central Asia’s energy 
resources. 
A. CHINESE SECURITY CONCERNS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
      The Xinjiang autonomous region in northwest China is the nation’s largest 
province.  It has borders with eight countries: Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan.  Militarily and economically, this 
province is of extreme importance to the Chinese government.  Militarily, the 
Taklamakan desert in the region contains China’s nuclear testing site, Lop Nor.  The 
Xinjiang province is nonetheless one of the most insecure provinces in China, due to the 
militant Uighur groups that operate in the region and the flow of narcotics, primarily 
heroin and opium, out of Afghanistan.  Economically, the region contains large deposits 
of oil, natural gas and minerals. Moreover, the province is the crucial link between China 
and the Central Asian energy resources.  However, despite the abundance of these 
profitable energy resources, the Xinjiang region is one of China’s least developed 
regions. 
      The Xinjiang autonomous province is also home to the Turkic-speaking Uighur 
people who make up roughly 47 percent (8.7 million) of the population, while the Han 
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Chinese make up the largest minority in the region with a population of 41 percent (7.5 
million).33 Having witnessed the victory of the Afghani Mujhadeen fighters over the 
Soviet invaders in the late 1980s and having watched their fellow Muslims in the Central 
Asian states gain their independence in 1991, the Uighurs lobbied heavily for the creation 
of their own independent state in the Xinjiang region, separate from the oppressive 
Chinese rule they had lived under for over 300 years.  However, because the Chinese 
government continued its oppression of the Uighur population, some Uighurs turned to 
militancy in an attempt to achieve independence from China.   
      The Uighur hopes of establishing an independent East Turkistan nation in what is 
now Xinjiang province have diminished as the Chinese Communist government has 
continually repressed and stifled any attempt at “splittism” or separatism.  This repression 
has resulted in the formation of several Islamic fundamentalist movements which have 
resorted to acts of terrorism in attempts to gain independence.  Two of the more 
prominent groups, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Home of East 
Turkestan Youth, have been linked to numerous assassinations of Chinese and Uighur 
Communist leaders as well as several terrorist bombings, including a deadly bombing on 
a Beijing bus. 
      The Chinese government holds that the Uighur terrorist groups receive aid and 
training from other radical Islamic groups in Central Asia.  Also, since the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the Chinese government has 
repeatedly asserted that the Uighur terrorist groups, most notably ETIM, have links to Al-
Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden.  ETIM was not, however, considered an international 
terrorist organization by the United States until 3 September 2002.34 It should be noted 
that “Before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, China sought to play down Uighur links to 
foreign movements, including al Qaeda and the Taliban.”35 This circumstance has led 
some observers to speculate that China’s post-11 September 2001 assertions regarding 
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such links may be opportunistic and calculated to legitimize Beijing’s actions against 
champions of Uighur independence. 
      Through the creation of the SCO, China has attempted to ensure that the Central 
Asian states, especially those that border the Xinjiang province, will not support Uighur 
independence and will assist Beijing in repressing all Uighur independence movements 
under the guise of the global war on terrorism.  While China has convinced other member 
states of the SCO to support its policies regarding Uighur independence, media criticism 
in some of the Central Asian states of these policies could undermine the cohesiveness of 
the SCO. 
     The most vocal critics of China’s policies towards ethnic Uighurs have been the 
Kazakh media.  The media in Kazakhstan have even criticized the SCO for keeping 
“silent about China’s repressing Uighurs.”36 The same report also stated that the Eastern 
Turkestan United National Revolutionary Front, one of the Uighur groups accused of 
terrorism by the Chinese government, had “boosted its activities in Kazakhstan.”37  If the 
report is well-founded, such activities could damage Chinese-Kazakh relations.  
      In addition to offering political support for China’s combat against Uighur 
separatists, the SCO has provided China with a means of satisfying its security concerns 
on its western borders.  The premise for the creation of the original “Shanghai Five” in 
1996 was “developing goodneighbourly and friendly relations, maintaining long-term 
stability in the border area, [and] strengthening mutual confidence in the military field in 
the border area.”38 By developing friendly relations through the SCO and through 
bilateral relations with its other neighbors, China is working to promote an atmosphere of 
stability in the 15 countries with which it currently shares a border. 
      A clear indication of the importance China has placed on the development of the 
SCO as a security mechanism in Central Asia has been the Chinese military’s 
participation in unprecedented military exercises outside its borders with a foreign 
country’s troops.  The first exercise, conducted jointly with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002, 
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was the first joint exercise within the SCO and involved training military forces to 
combat terrorism, extremism and separatism, which China believes are the “three evil 
forces” creating instability in the Central Asian region.39  
      According to a Kyrgyz source, “The maneuvers are taking place over two days 
near the Irkeshtam crossing on the Kyrgyz-Chinese border and involve some 300 troops 
from China’s Xinjiang military district and Kyrgyzstan’s defense ministry and border 
forces.”40  Other member nations of the SCO participated as observers in the exercise. 
      The second anti-terror exercise conducted within the framework of the SCO 
occurred in two phases.  The first phase took place in Kazakhstan from 6 to 10 August 
2003 and the second phase took place in China’s Xinjiang region on 11-12 August 2003.  
The second phase of the exercise marked the first time a foreign military force was 
allowed to enter China in order to conduct joint exercises in over 53 years.41 
      The first stage of the exercise focused “on creating the joint command, planning 
the operation, organizing ‘combat actions’, managing the forces and funds allocated, 
intercepting a ‘transgressor aircraft’ and forcing it to land, landing troops and blocking 
and destroying a group of ‘terrorists’.”42 The second phase of the exercise involved 
surrounding and storming a “terrorist” camp and freeing hostages. 
      The exercise included military forces from all of the member states of the SCO 
except Uzbekistan.  The exercise, the largest multinational exercise the Chinese military 
has participated in, further demonstrated Beijing’s desire to see the security mechanism 
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China’s Xinjiang region, also sends a clear signal to Uighur militant groups operating in 
the region.   
B. COUNTERING U.S. HEGEMONY IN CENTRAL ASIA 
      The SCO has also given China an organization in which to push its anti-U.S. 
views with Russia’s backing.  China and Russia have consistently used the joint 
declarations of the member nations of the SCO to voice their opposition to U.S. policies.  
For example, the July 2000 Dushanbe Declaration voiced opposition to the U.S. missile 
defense program by emphasizing “the unconditional need for the preservation and strict 
observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty prohibiting the establishment of systems of anti-
missile defense of the territories of countries.”43 The declaration of the SCO affirmed 
“support for the position of China coming out against the plans to include Taiwan in the 
ABM system of a theatre of war by any state and in any form.”44  
      Other declarations by the organization have targeted U.S. human rights policies.  
The SCO member nations expressed opposition to “the use of ‘double standards’ in 
questions of human rights and interference in the internal affairs of other states under the 
pretext of defending them.”45 This provision is obviously directed at U.S. and European 
concerns about Chechnya and Tibet. 
     Another anti-U.S. provision which China pushed for among the members of the 
SCO addresses the question of Taiwan’s potential independence.  The United States is 
obligated to aid Taiwan’s capacity to deter Beijing through the 1979 Taiwan Relations 
Act.  Under this act, “It is the policy of the United States… to provide Taiwan with arms 
of a defensive character; and…to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any 
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social 
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”46 Beijing views Taiwan as a Chinese 
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province and rival national government (until 1991), not an independent nation.  China 
has succeeded in gaining the backing of the SCO’s member nations, including Russia, in 
holding “that the Government of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] is the sole lawful 
government representing all of China, and that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory 
of China.”47  
C. ECONOMIC AND TRADE BENEFITS OF THE SCO 
      It appears that the final reason China pushed for the creation of the SCO was to 
promote closer economic and trade ties, especially in the energy resources sector, with 
the Central Asian states.  The most populous nation in the world, China has become the 
world’s second largest energy consumer behind the United States.  China has also 
become the world’s third largest oil consumer behind the United States and Japan, with 
5.26 million barrels of oil consumed per day in 2002.48 Since Japan’s oil demand has 
become stagnant, future oil consumption projections have China surpassing Japan as the 
second largest oil consumer by the end of 2003.  By the year 2025, oil consumption in 
China could be around 10.9 million barrels per day.49  
      The projected increasing level of oil consumption in the future has led China to 
search for more sources of natural energy.  China’s Ministry of Finance has estimated 
that by the year 2010 China’s energy needs will necessitate the importation of up to 120 
million tons of oil per year, which would be double the amount of oil that China imported 
in 2002.50 The large proven oil reserves in Central Asia and the possible large but as yet 
unproven reserves in this region help to explain China’s eagerness to develop close 
economic and trade ties with these former Soviet republics.  Rising energy requirements 
also explain China’s fervor in developing the known energy resources in Xinjiang 
province. 
      The SCO has allowed China to develop close ties with the Central Asian states, 
and mework for its efforts to become a major player in the race                                                  has provided a political fra 
47 Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 June 2002.  
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for the energy resources of the region.  Chinese oil firms have invested considerably in 
Central Asian oil companies, most notably in Kazakhstan.  The most noteworthy deal 
was the acquisition by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) of a 60 percent 
stake in the Kazakh oil firm Aktobemunaigaz.51  The CNPC also recently acquired a 25 
percent stake in a Caspian Basin joint venture with Aktobemunaigaz.52 The joint venture 
with Aktobemunaigaz propels China into the Caspian Basin oil controversy, something 
the Kazakh government openly welcomes because it hopes to benefit from Beijing’s 
support.   
      The division of the Caspian Sea and of the numerous oil and natural gas fields 
located in the Caspian Basin has been a source of tension between the countries which 
border the sea since the break up of the Soviet Union.  These countries include 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan.  Numerous ideas have been 
introduced on how to solve the territorial dispute issues, but no solution has been agreed 
upon by all the interested parties. 
      Although Kazakhstan and Russia have come to a bilateral agreement on the 
division of the northern Caspian Sea, an agreement which Iran does not concur with, the 
presence of Chinese oil companies, under the auspices of joint ventures with Kazakh oil 
firms, may allow the Kazakh government to feel a little more secure in future dealings 
with Russia over Caspian Basin territorial disputes.  However, tensions over the Caspian 
Basin’s energy resources and territorial boundaries could undermine the SCO by souring 
relations between Kazakhstan, Russia and China. 
      In addition to considerable investments by Chinese oil firms in Kazakh oil fields 
and companies, China has also proposed the development of an oil pipeline from 
Kazakhstan to China’s eastern coast.  This pipeline would help China meet its domestic 
oil consumption needs, and would also allow it to export more oil to Japan and the 
Southeast Asian region.  Development of the proposed pipeline has been delayed until the 
reserves in Kazakh oil fields have been proven sufficient to make it economically 
worthwhile.  




      In addition to energy resources, Central Asia has become increasingly important 
to China in the trade of consumer goods.  Chinese products have flooded Central Asian 
markets, replacing once-abundant Russian products.  Chinese trade and foreign 
investment continue to increase with the Central Asian states.  It is noteworthy in this 
regard that the Heads of States participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 
meeting on 30 May 2003 pledged “to help intensify the ongoing negotiating process on 
ways of creating favorable conditions for trade and investment and on completing the 
draft long-term program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation.”53 
           In Kazakhstan alone there are currently 20 accredited Chinese companies 
operating and around 600 Chinese companies operating in joint ventures.54 In June 2003 
Chinese President Hu Jintao and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev promised to 
increase bilateral trade from $2 billion in 2002 to $5 billion “over the next two years.”55 
In addition to developing economic and trade ties with Kazakhstan, Chinese companies 
have been developing Kyrgyzstan’s coal industry.  As the top coal consumer in the world, 
China would benefit from the development of Kyrgyzstan’s coal resources.       
     Interest in reviving the old “silk route” is also apparent, as indicated in the 
statement released after the organization’s meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 25 August 
1999.  This statement indicated that  
                                                
All the parties support the “Silk Road Diplomacy” concept…The concept, 
expected to be realized by restoring the ancient “Silk Road” in the 
contemporary international cooperation, is aimed at promoting the 
sustainable development of the regional economy and strengthening 
regional peace and stability.56 
 
If this came to fruition, China would be linked to Europe via a significant overland trade 
route.  China has shown interest in developing new transportation routes through the 
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region.  Beijing has proposed the development of rail links through the Central Asian 
states which would ultimately be connected with rail links in Europe.  China has begun 
constructing a rail link through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and countries of the Middle East 
and Europe to Rotterdam.57 
D. CONCLUSION 
      Through the SCO China is successfully accomplishing two of its main goals.  
First, China is effectively creating, albeit slowly, the security and stability it needs on its 
western borders and in its Xinjiang province.  Also, through the SCO China has 
masterfully gained the support of the Central Asian regimes in suppressing the Uighur 
independence movement.  This may allow China to further develop its western regions, 
most notably Xinjiang, and provide a secure environment for energy transportation links, 
including oil and natural gas pipelines. 
     The second goal China is accomplishing through the SCO is increasing its 
economic and trade ties with the Central Asian states.  China has positioned itself as a 
major player in the race to develop Central Asia’s energy resources.  China has also 
increased its bilateral trade with each of the Central Asian countries, flooding the Central 
Asian markets with Chinese goods.  China’s investment in the development of rail links 
through the Central Asian region appears intended to allow Chinese products to move 
more quickly and more affordably to the European markets. 
      China will probably continue to gain support for the SCO as long it continues to 
provide economic benefits, in the form of trade and investments, to the Central Asian 
states, and as long as it continues to take an active role in Central Asian security.  
Because Moscow is unable to compete militarily or economically with Beijing, China 
naturally finds itself assuming the leadership position of the organization.  It is no 
surprise that the organization’s secretariat will have its headquarters in Beijing beginning 
in January 2004 and that the first executive secretary of the SCO will be the Chinese 
Ambassador to Russia Zhang Deguang.   
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IV. THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES PERSPECTIVE 
      From the Central Asian states’ perspective, the creation of the SCO could 
potentially satisfy two important needs.  First and foremost, the SCO could provide the 
security and stability the region desperately needs.  The organization could also help to 
maintain the political balance between Central Asia’s two most powerful and influential 
neighbors, China and Russia.  The second important need of the Central Asian states is 
economic aid, particularly assistance in the development of their energy resources.  The 
SCO can provide the Central Asian states with this through increased trade and direct 
foreign investment from Russian and Chinese firms. 
      Severe poverty, repression, narcotics smuggling, corruption among key leaders, 
and a continuing rise in radical Islamic fundamentalism have led to growing instability in 
the region.  Most of the region’s problems can be traced back to the pre-independence 
period, when the Soviet Union still controlled these states.   
The Soviet policies of closed borders, forced cotton agriculture, farm 
collectivization, population relocation, and-most significant-Stalin’s 
redrawing of the map of Central Asia to create five incongruous states had 
left the region economically hard-pressed, ethnically and politically 
divided, and forced to practice its majority religion-Islam-in secret.58 
  
      Most of these problems persist today.  The leaders of the Central Asian states, 
who for the most part came to power via the Soviet communist party, still run 
authoritarian regimes in which corruption is widespread, with obvious religious 
persecution.  The region is also one of the poorest in the world, despite the abundance of 
revenue-producing energy resources.  Central Asia has also become a major “highway” 
for narcotics gangs to get their products from Afghanistan to European and Asian 
markets.    These persistent problems have led to the widespread increase in radical 
Islam, which has been perhaps the primary cause of instability in Central Asia. 
      The weak national governments of the former Soviet republics have neither the 
military nor the economic resources needed to combat these growing security problems.  
They desperately needed foreign assistance and therefore endorsed China’s suggestion 
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for the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  The SCO has the potential to 
provide these Central Asian states with the military and economic support they need as 
well as aid in the development of each nation’s energy resources.59   
A. SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES: 
MILITANT ISLAM 
      The re-birth of militant Islam in Central Asia occurred in Uzbekistan just prior to 
the break-up of the Soviet Union.  In late 1991 in Namangan, Uzbekistan, shortly before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, a group of young Islamic militants led by Tohir 
Yuldeshev and Jumaboi Khojaev, seized the headquarters building of the Communist 
Party of Uzbekistan.  The group had become enraged at the refusal by the Mayor of 
Namangan to give them land to build a mosque.  This seemingly minor incident became 
the spark for the rapid spread of radical Islam throughout Central Asia through the 1990s 
and into the new millennium.  The spread of radical, militant Islam is a primary cause of 
the insecurity and instability which currently afflict the region. 
      The two leaders of this violent Islamic revolution, Yuldeshev and Khojaev (who 
later changed his name to Juma Namangani in honor of his hometown of Namangan), 
would eventually create the most violent of the radical Islamic groups currently 
terrorizing Central Asia, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  Yuldeshev and 
Namangani created the IMU in Kabul, Afghanistan, during the summer of 1998 with 
economic aid and military training from Mullah Omar, former leader of the ousted 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and Osama Bin Laden, the wealthy leader of the world 
terrorist organization al Qaeda. 
      Yeldeshev declared in the summer of 1998 that the goals of the IMU “are firstly 
fighting against oppression within our country [Uzbekistan], against bribery, against the 
inequities and also freeing of our Muslim brothers from prison.”60 Yeldeshev also stated, 
“We declared a jihad in order to create a religious system, a religious government.  We 
want to create a sharia system…Before we build an Islamic state we primarily want to get 
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out from under oppression.  We are therefore now shedding blood, and the creation of an 
Islamic state will be the next problem.”61  
      A second radical Islamic group vying for control of Central Asia, Hizb ut-Tahrir 
al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation, also known as HT), shares goals with the IMU 
but with some differences.   HT envisions creating a Muslim state encompassing all of 
Central Asia.  “The HT has a vision of uniting Central Asia, Xinjiang Province in China, 
and eventually the entire umma (Islamic world community) under a khilafat (caliphate) 
that would reestablish the Khilafat-i-Rashida, which ruled the Arab Muslims for a short 
time after The Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632.”62 The HT also believes in achieving 
these goals by peaceful means.   
      The stated goals of the IMU, as previously mentioned, are to depose the 
government of Karimov in Uzbekistan and make Uzbekistan an Islamic state.  While 
there are other small, radical Islamic groups in Central Asia, the IMU and the HT are the 
two primary groups in size and popularity.  The IMU was recognized as a terrorist 
organization by the United States under Executive Order 13224 on 23 August 2001.63 
      The HT was created by Shiek Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastyn, a Palestinian, in 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan in 1953, and was first introduced in Central Asia in 1995.  The 
group believes that gaining mass support through non-violent means will eventually lead 
to a peaceful overthrow of the Central Asian governments by its mass supporters.  
Whereas the IMU gains most of its recruits from the peasant farmers and rural areas of 
Central Asia, HT receives most of its support from the urban intelligentsia.  College 
students and teachers are among its most active supporters. 
      Despite the events in the early 1990s, including the Tajik civil war and the 
incident in the Namangan province of Uzbekistan, radical Islam was not considered a 
major problem in Central Asia until 1996 when the Taliban came to power in 
Afghanistan.  The Taliban victory in Afghanistan ensured a secure place for the training, 
coordination and economic backing of radical Islamic groups throughout the world, 
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including the IMU.  Although the rise of the Taliban united the Central Asian 
governments in cooperation to fight militant Islam, it was not until 1999 that “a shift took 
place from only talking about regional cooperation to taking real measures against 
Islamists.”64 
      Two events in 1999 caused the shift: the attempted assassination of Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov in a series of car bombings in Tashkent in February and the 
incursion by Islamists into the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in August.  The incursions 
resulted in the kidnapping of several hostages.  These two events illustrated the extreme 
threat posed by radical Islamic groups which now confronted the governments of the 
Central Asian states. 
      Since the U.S.-led war against the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the threat posed by the IMU in Central 
Asia has significantly decreased but has not disappeared.  A large number of IMU 
fighters were either killed or scattered while fighting alongside Taliban and al Qaeda 
fighters in Afghanistan.  According to the State Department’s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 2001, the military leader of the IMU, Juma Namangani, was killed during an 
air strike at the battle of Kondoz in November 2001.65  The political and ideological 
leader, Tohir Yoldashev, still remains at large.  The same report stated that the United 
States could not find any link between HT and terrorist activities.  Therefore, Hizb ut-
Tahrir al-Islami has not been considered a terrorist organization by the United States. 
B. FACTORS AIDING THE SPREAD OF RADICAL ISLAM 
      Several factors have led to the insecurity and instability in the Central Asian 
region, but the primary cause of the instability appears to be the spread of radical Islam.  
However, several factors common to all of the Central Asian states have directly 
contributed to the rapid spread of radical Islam. 
      One factor contributing to the spread of radical Islam is the severe poverty of the 
region, a cause of the deplorable living conditions.  For example, in Kyrgyzstan the 
average annual per capita income in 2001 was $290 U.S., and 55 percent of the 
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population lived below the poverty line.66 In Uzbekistan, the most populous of the 
Central Asian states, the average annual per capita income in 2001 was $237 U.S.67  
Tajikistan has the weakest economy of the Central Asian states with an average annual 
per capita income in 2001 of $161 U.S.68 In 2000 80 percent of the population lived 
below the poverty line.69 Kazakhstan has developed the strongest economy of the Central 
Asian states, due to its successful economic reforms in the late 1990s.  Kazakhstan also 
possesses large amounts of energy resources, notably oil, which continue to be the 
country’s primary exports.  The average annual per capita income for Kazakhstan in 2002 
was $1,640 U.S.70 
      The poorest regions of the Central Asian states have become the primary 
recruiting grounds for militant Islamic groups.  Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region is evidence 
of how the socio-economic conditions are affecting the government’s fight to stop the 
spread of radical Islam.  The region is Kyrgyzstan’s most impoverished, with high 
unemployment, a high birth rate and depleted natural resources.  Most of the factories 
supporting the region’s industry have been shut down since the early 1990s and basic 
services, including electricity, are scarce.  This severe poverty has driven a significant 
number of the region’s younger males into the ranks of the IMU. 
      According to Ercan Murat, the U.N. head of mission for Kyrgyzstan, “Poverty is 
playing into the hands of the [Islamic] extremists.  There is nothing like poverty, hunger 
and not having access to basic services, such as decent housing to create discontent.”71 
This discontent is driving Muslims, notably young men, into militant Islamic groups.  A 
social worker, Gulmira Dovutoka, in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan described the 
growing problem there.  “It’s the same everywhere -- the villages are empty of young 
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men -- either they have gone to Russia to look for work or they join Namangani [The 
military leader of the IMU] because at least he pays them.”72 
      The authoritarian leaders of the Central Asian states, whose political and religious 
oppression has come under continuing scrutiny from human rights watch groups, have 
actually contributed to the rise in Islamic fundamentalism through their oppressive 
regimes.  This is most evident in Uzbekistan, where Uzbek President Islam Karimov has 
instituted several oppressive policies to crack down on political and religious groups. 
      Karimov was elected president in 1991 after the breakup of the Soviet Union.  
Since first taking office, Karimov has held several referendums to extend his stay in 
office.  He has also introduced several laws which severely restrict the activities of 
religious groups in Uzbekistan, predominantly Islamic organizations, despite the fact that 
88 percent of the Uzbek population is Muslim. 73  Moreover, Karimov’s strict border 
regulations and economic policies have contributed to the severe poverty in the country. 
      Uzbekistan law requires all religious organizations to register with the 
government and to satisfy requirements for their registration in addition to a list of 
names, at least one hundred, of registered members of the organization.  Other laws 
prohibit religious organizations from forming political parties or social movements, ban 
the Koran from all detention facilities, and forbid Muslims in prison to pray. 
      Two laws were passed in Uzbekistan in May 1998.  The first was the Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.  This law  
restricts religious rights that are judged to be in conflict with national 
security, prohibits proselytizing, bans religious subjects in schools, 
prohibits private teaching of religious principles, forbids the wearing of 
religious clothing in public by anyone other than clerics, and requires 
religious groups to obtain a license to publish or distribute materials.74 
 
The second law passed in May 1998 increased the penalties for violating these new 
religious laws and provided punishment for “activities such as organizing a banned 
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religious group, persuading others to join such a group, and drawing minors into a 
religious organization without the permission of their parents.”75 
      Karimov has specifically targeted Islam by having all loud speakers removed 
from mosques to stop the amplified call to prayer, having the government regulate the 
content of every imam’s sermons and by closing a large number of mosques throughout 
Uzbekistan. 
      Although the government of Islam Karimov has led the way in religious 
persecution, the other former Soviet republics have begun to follow Uzbekistan’s lead.  
In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s government has stepped up pressure on 
certain “non-traditional” religious groups.  Religious groups in Kazakhstan are not 
required to register with the government, unless they plan to purchase land, hire 
employees or perform any other legal transactions.  A new administrative code instituted 
in February 2001 “allows the national and local authorities to suspend the activities or 
fine the leaders of unregistered religious organizations.”76  
      Kyrgyzstan has been the most liberal regarding freedom of religion since 
becoming an independent state in 1991.  However, following the incursions and 
kidnappings by the IMU in 1999 and 2000, Kyrgyzstan has increased its religious 
persecution, mainly against Islamic groups that it deems a threat to national security.   
      The crackdown on Islamic groups in Kyrgyzstan may also result from pressure 
exerted on Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev by the governments of Uzbekistan and China.  
Uzbekistan’s President Karimov criticized Kyrgyzstan’s military for being weak and the 
Kyrgyz government for “collusion with the IMU,”77 after it paid the terrorist group a 
ransom in exchange for the release of the hostages they had kidnapped during the 
incursions in 1999 and 2000. Karimov also accused Tajikistan of harboring terrorist 
groups after the IMU launched raids from bases in Tajikistan.  Immediately following the 
accusations Karimov ordered the Uzbek military to conduct air strikes against suspected 
IMU safe havens in Kyrgyz and Tajik territory.   
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      China also began to pressure Kyrgyzstan to take a tougher stance against Muslim 
Uighurs living in Kyrgyzstan.  The Chinese government believes that Uighur terrorist 
groups in China’s Xinjiang province are receiving aid from Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan and 
other Central Asian states.  The Kyrgyz government eventually began to clamp down on 
the ethnic Uighur population in Kyrgyzstan by arresting several Uighurs it suspected of 
having ties to Uighur terrorist organizations. 
      Tajikistan’s relations with Islamic fundamentalist groups differ from those of 
other Central Asian states.  Islamic militant groups played a significant role in the Tajik 
civil war in 1992-1997.  The 1997 agreement between the ruling party and the Party of 
the Revival of Tajikistan (PIRT), which formed the backbone of the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO) during the civil war, allocated thirty percent of the senior government 
posts to the PIRT.78 This agreement has enabled Tajikistan to be the only Central Asian 
state with an active Islamic party.  The PIRT is comprised of several opposition parties 
which include Islamic groups.  During the civil war the UTO launched guerrilla attacks 
on the national militia and ethnic Russians living in Dushanbe, while reportedly receiving 
supplies and support from the Northern Alliance in northern Afghanistan.79   
      The Russian military still maintains a significant presence in Tajikistan.  
Approximately 6,000 troops from Russia’s 201st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14,000-16,000 
troops from the Russian Federal Border Service, and a small contingent of support and 
reconnaissance aircraft have assisted the Tajik government in maintaining the peace since 
the civil war.  The Russians have also helped the Tajik border patrol in stemming the 
incursions of radical Islamists, and in stopping the illegal flow of narcotics and weapons 
out of Afghanistan.80 
      Since the U.S.-led war on terror began in October 2001, Tajik government 
officials (including PIRT members) have done all they can to distance themselves from 
the IMU and other radical Islamic groups.  The government has increased its pressure on 
radical Islamic groups by expelling certain imams who, the government judged, were 
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preaching radical ideology with the intent of promoting opposition to the state.  The 
government has also forced numerous other imams to swear loyalty to the government. 
      Socio-economic conditions and oppression have been the primary factors driving 
young Muslims in the Central Asian states towards radical or militant Islam.  The 
authoritarian governments have been unable to develop a plan that could pull their 
nations out of the doldrums of poverty despite the abundance of revenue-producing 
energy resources.  Until these governments institute economic and political reforms that 
will produce democratic societies and market economies, they can expect a continued 
increase in Islamic fundamentalism. 
C. OTHER DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
      As previously noted, the primary destabilizing factor in the Central Asian region 
is the continuing rise of Islamic fundamentalism.  However, several other factors 
contribute to the instability and insecurity in the region.  Narcotics trafficking, unresolved 
border issues, and the struggle for water resources could ultimately have a major impact 
on cooperation and cohesion within the SCO. 
      Narcotics trafficking dramatically increased in Central Asia throughout the 1990s.  
The UNDCP (UN Drug Control Program) estimated that by 1999 Afghanistan was 
producing 75% of the world’s opium.81 This opium is making it to the world markets via 
Central Asia.  The drugs are smuggled from Afghanistan through the Central Asian 
states, most notably Tajikistan, into Russia and Europe.   
      Although all the Central Asian states have been affected by the illegal narcotics 
trade, Tajikistan has undoubtedly bore the brunt of the problem.  In 2000 it was estimated 
that 300-500 tons of opium equivalent or 30-50 tons of heroin travel through Tajikistan 
per year.82 Despite the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, opium trafficking is not 
showing any signs of decline.  1,700 kg of drugs, including 1,100 kg of heroin, were 
confiscated by Tajik border guards on the Afghan-Tajik border in the first six months of 
2002.83  
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      The narcotics trade in Central Asia is also a primary source of funding for militant 
Islamic groups.  The IMU reportedly has been using its militants to move opium and 
heroin through the region into Russia and to their contacts in Chechnya and eventually 
onto the European market.  The revenue earned from moving just a kilogram of heroin 
through Central Asia is well worth the risk in a region fraught with poverty.  According 
to retired U.S. Ambassador Grant Smith, “the profit from moving a kilogram of heroin 
across Tajikistan, which ranges from $4000 if the destination is neighboring countries, to 
$14,000 if the destination is Moscow.”84  
      The ongoing squabbles over unresolved border issues constitute another factor 
contributing to the instability in the region.  This problem directly emanates from Joseph 
Stalin’s decision to re-draw the borders of the Central Asian republics in the 1920s.  The 
borders were drawn with no apparent rhyme or reason other than the Soviet leader’s 
attempts to keep these republics in constant turmoil and dependent on Moscow for 
security and stability. 
      The majority of the border issues are centered in the Ferghana Valley region of 
Central Asia.  This region is considered the heart of Central Asia because it is where the 
majority of the population is located.  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share 
common borders within this region.  The borders between these three nations in the 
Ferghana Valley are complex and bewildering.  The Soviet re-drawing of the borders left 
thousands of people of various ethnic minorities stranded in enclaves in each of the three 
nations. 
      Two examples are the problematic Sukh and Vorukh enclaves in Kyrgyzstan.  
“The Sukh Enclave, with a population of 43,000 people and an area the size of the Gaza 
Strip, is part of Uzbekistan, stranded in and surrounded on all sides by Kyrgyzstan…The 
enclave is predominantly populated by Tajiks.”85 The Vorukh enclave, also within 
Kyrgyzstan, is actually part of the territory of Tajikistan, with the majority of the 
population consisting of Tajiks. 
      The difficulties which these borders create have only been exacerbated by the 
governments of these Central Asian states.   Strict border policies (and, in the case of 
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Uzbekistan, mining of the border areas) continue to create tension among the three states.  
Uzbekistan mined its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in an attempt to stop IMU 
incursions.   
      The strict border regulations have taken their toll on the poverty-stricken 
population.  “The new borders have divided villages, farms, and families.  For farmers to 
visit their relatives in the next village across the border, they now need a passport that 
costs the equivalent of a hundred dollars and a visa costing ten.”86 The strict border 
regulations have also contributed to a third factor destabilizing the region and a potential 
threat that could undermine the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  That factor is the 
ongoing dispute over water resources. 
      The Aral Sea basin in Central Asia covers most of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, plus part of Kazakhstan.  The basin supports 75 percent of 
Central Asia’s population and contains 90 percent of the region’s surface water.87 The 
Aral Sea is primarily fed by two rivers, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya.  The head 
waters for these two major rivers are located in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.   
      Because the head waters of the region’s two largest rivers are located in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, these countries have an abundance of water resources, 
providing 90 percent of all available water in the region.88 They primarily use the water 
for hydroelectric power with irrigation as a secondary use.  Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
and the southern oblasts of Kazakhstan are the downstream users of both rivers.  These 
three nations use the water primarily for irrigation and drinking water.  The allocation of 
water among these nations is where the heart of the conflict lies. 
      Despite the abundance of water in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, under current water 
agreements in the region, they are allocated less than a quarter of the water for their own 
needs.  Under these same agreements Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and portions of 
Kazakhstan are allocated a larger percentage of the water resources in exchange for 
energy resources, including natural gas, oil, electricity and coal. 
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      The three downstream states, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, rely 
primarily on agriculture exports for their revenue.  90 percent of their crops, primarily 
cotton, come from irrigated lands.89 In recent years Kyrgyzstan has indicated that it 
wished to allocate a larger percentage of its water for irrigation, and this has sparked 
sharp protests from the downstream users.   
      The prominence of these water issues in regional politics is evident in the ongoing 
disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  In the past Kyrgyzstan has decreased the 
water flow for various reasons, but primarily to counter Uzbekistan’s decrease in energy 
resources or in order to seek more monetary compensation.  Similarly, Uzbekistan has 
stopped the export of energy resources, notably natural gas, to Kyrgyzstan to protest the 
decrease in water resources from Kyrgyzstan.  There are also ongoing water disputes 
between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan.  However, these water issues have not yet come to the forefront of the 
SCO’s internal politics.  The nations of Central Asia tentatively solved these issues and 
came to a comprehensive agreement on water allocation at a May 2003 meeting in Kiev, 
Ukraine, of the all-European conference of environment ministers.90   
      A tentative solution to the environmental problems in the region was agreed upon 
by all countries in Central Asia.  A sub-regional report at the May 2003 Kiev meeting on 
the environment, water and security in Central Asia set forth goals which all countries 
agreed to fully support.  The Central Asian countries also agreed to develop the Central 
Asian Sustainable Development Initiative announced at the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development and the Millennium Goals established at the Millennium 
Summit in September 2000.91   
D. ECONOMIC CONCERNS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES 
      Besides guarantees of security within the Central Asian region, the former Soviet 
republics are earnestly seeking economic support from China and Russia within the 
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framework of the SCO, as well as from the West, notably the United States.   The 
economies of these former Soviet republics have been unable to capitalize on the 
exploitation of the region’s abundant natural resources. 
      Several factors have played significant roles in dragging the economies of these 
states down.  Large foreign debt, corruption, and a reluctance to implement market 
reforms have all affected the economic performance of these former Soviet republics 
since they gained independence in 1991.  However, the largest economic hurdle these 
nations face is a lack of transportation.   
      The landlocked nations of Central Asia have no sea port through which to ship 
their products to world markets.  The railroad infrastructure built in Soviet times is 
functioning but has a very limited number of outlets.  “All freight transported west from 
China enters Kazakhstan at Dostyk border crossing.  From there, there are two alternative 
routes:  one across Kazakhstan to Russia, and the second southwest through Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey.”92     
      The development of new railways has been extremely slow in materializing due to 
the lack of sufficient income to fund the projects.  The mountainous topography of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has also hindered the construction of proposed railways 
linking China’s Xinjiang province with the Central Asian states via Kyrgyzstan.  An 
extensive rail system would be the most efficient means of getting Central Asia’s bulky 
exports, including coal, steel and iron, to world markets. 
      A second transportation problem facing the Central Asian region is the lack of 
transport routes for the region’s vast energy resources, notably oil and natural gas.  
Currently, the limited numbers of oil and natural gas pipelines run through Russia.  This 
has left the former Soviet republics, primarily Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
dependent on Moscow for transportation of their primary export. 
      Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s largest oil producer.  30 percent of the government’s 
budget revenue comes from its oil industry.93 Direct foreign investment in Kazakhstan’s 
oil fields has steadily increased over the last decade. However, foreign investors have 
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been hesitant to invest more extensively in Kazakhstan due to the high level of corruption 
and the lack of democratic reforms.  Paul O’Neill, then the U.S. treasury secretary, 
addressed the situation encompassing all of Central Asia at a conference on security and 
economic prospects in Eurasia in September 2002.  “Without the rule of law and 
enforceable contracts and attacks on corruption, it’s pretty difficult to make real progress 
on the other things that matter in life, and it’s very problematic that foreign direct 
investment will expose itself in the absence of those things.”94 
      Uzbekistan is the region’s third largest oil producer, behind Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, and the largest natural gas producer, with over 66.2 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas reserves.  However, Uzbekistan also lacks sufficient funds and direct foreign 
investment.  The exploitation of Uzbekistan’s older oil and natural gas fields by the 
Soviets and their successors has resulted in the exhaustion of existing fields, while the 
development of new fields has been slow.   
      The only transport route for Uzbek oil is a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan 
to Omsk, Russia, and the only natural gas pipeline, the Central Asia-Center Pipeline, 
transports Uzbek and Turkmen gas north where it runs directly into Russia’s natural gas 
pipeline system.  Uzbekistan also supplies Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with natural gas, 
and receives water in exchange from Kyrgyzstan. 
      Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have minimal amounts of oil and natural gas reserves 
and the extremely mountainous topography makes extraction of the energy resources 
difficult.  However, both countries have an abundance of water, which is used primarily 
for electricity generation and irrigation.  Tajikistan has the weakest economy of the 
Central Asian states and has to rely on foreign and humanitarian aid for its basic needs. 
E. EXPECTATIONS FROM THE SCO 
      To what extent can the SCO satisfy the security and economic needs of the 
Central Asian states?  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created on the 
premise of combating the security challenges now facing the Central Asian region.  
Beijing and Moscow underscored the urgency of stopping the spread of radical Islam  
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before its momentum carried it across their borders.  If it could contain Islamic 
extremism, the SCO could undoubtedly have a tremendous impact on security and 
stability in the Central Asian region.   
      Through the SCO China has provided military support to the Central Asian states 
in the form of troops, equipment, and training.  As noted earlier, China has also 
conducted military exercises with one of the Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan, aimed at 
training both nations’ armed forces in fighting terrorism.  This was important for two 
reasons.  First, it was the first time that the military of the People’s Republic of China has 
conducted exercises with a foreign nation outside its borders.  Second, for the first time, 
through the SCO, “China has publicly consented to spell out conditions under which it 
would be willing to project its military forces beyond its own borders.”95 The Central 
Asian states may assume that a strong commitment from China in guaranteeing security 
support will provide the stability the region is desperately searching for. 
      Russia has also provided the former Soviet republics with military support, 
notably weapons and equipment, and Moscow has also aided in training Central Asian 
armies.  Russia still maintains a significant military presence in Tajikistan with the 201st 
Motorized Rifle Division and the Federal Border Guard.  The Russians also maintain a 
military presence in Kyrgyzstan at the headquarters of the CIS Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) as part of the CSTO rapid reaction force.   
      A final mechanism which could ultimately support stability and security in the 
Central Asian region is the SCO’s anti-terrorism center.  When operational in January 
2004, it could provide the leadership, coordination and support needed to bring stability 
to the region.  
     The SCO may contribute to the revival of the economies of the Central Asian 
states through direct foreign investment and the development of oil and natural gas fields 
and transportation routes.  The proposals by the organization to establish a free trade zone 
and closer cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) may enhance 
the prospects for a more rapid development of free market economies.  
      Chinese oil firms have already invested large amounts of money in the 
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both developing alternate export routes for Central Asian oil and natural gas, and China 
has been steadily increasing the amount of trade it conducts with the Central Asian states.  
Action on a Chinese proposal for a 3,200 km pipeline extending from an oil field in 
Kazakhstan to China’s Xinjiang region has not materialized due to the high cost.96 The 
proposal for the pipeline was first advanced in 1997.  China’s National Offshore Oil 
Corporation has recently invested $615 million in Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field in the 
Caspian Sea, which gives the oil company an 8.3 percent share in the oil field’s 
production.97 
      China has also lobbied, through the SCO, to develop much needed rail links from 
Central Asia to China and from Central Asia to Europe.  Also, China has openly backed 
the former Soviet republics in their bids for entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
      Russian companies have also been investing in new transport routes for Central 
Asian oil and natural gas.  Unable to compete financially with China or the West, Russian 
oil and natural gas companies have been investing in joint ventures with Chinese and 
Western companies for the development of these new transport routes.  Russia and 
Kazakhstan have concluded agreements on transporting Kazakh oil through Russia and 
have recently reached an agreement on transporting Russian oil through Kazakhstan to 
Turkmenistan.  However, because of past tariff disagreements, Kazakhstan is still 
pursuing alternate routes for its oil and natural gas in order to bypass Russian pipelines.   
      The SCO has the potential to contribute security and economic support to the 
Central Asian states.  Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev expressed his support for 
the SCO by stating that Kazakhstan “actively backs the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in the belief that it will serve economic and political cooperation between 
member countries and will promote security and calm in the region.”98  
      Uzbek President Islam Karimov voiced his support for the organization at the 
SCO summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 5 July 2000. 
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At present one can notice the tangible role played by this regional group in 
tackling the issues of security, prevention and localization of conflicts, 
maintaining stability, reinforcing law and order, fighting drug trafficking, 
that is in settling those problems upon which the consistent and 
progressive development of the entire regional community depends.99 
 
      A second military exercise under the auspices of the SCO, which took place in 
August 2003, helped to strengthen the military cooperation among the member states and 
demonstrated China’s and Russia’s determination to stabilize the region.  The economic 
potential for the Central Asian states through the SCO is significant.  The SCO proposal 
to develop the old “silk route” would open up Central Asian trade to large markets in 
Europe and Asia and would address the transportation shortcomings hindering the 
region’s economic development.  
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF SCO ENLARGEMENT 
      Although no official enlargement of the organization is at hand in the foreseeable 
future, several Asian and Middle Eastern nations have voiced interest in the organization.  
India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan and Turkmenistan have all been mentioned as potential 
future members.  However, despite the claims by SCO members that the organization is 
open to new members “which share the goals and tasks of cooperation within the 
framework of the organization,”100 how open is the organization?  Could the United 
States one day become a member?   
      The repeated claims by the SCO in declarations and joint communiqués that the 
organization is open can be disputed.  Japan reportedly had received an invitation to join 
the organization from Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev.  However, other 
members of the SCO, notably China and Russia, rejected Japan’s acceptance into the 
organization.  Despite rejecting the inclusion of Japan, a staunch U.S. ally, in the SCO, 
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has not ruled out the possibility of the United States 
joining the organization.  When asked about possible U.S. inclusion in the organization, 
Putin stated, “We do not know about a US desire to join the SCO, but we do not rule this 
out.”101 It remains to be seen if the SCO is indeed open to any nation which shares its 
goals.  
      Currently, the member nations of the SCO “have a population of 1.5 billion; they 
control thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and this combined 
conventional military force numbers 3.6 million.”102 However, could these armed forces 
of the member nations effectively act together?  Could the SCO develop integrated 
command and staff arrangements similar to those of NATO?  It should be noted that the 
SCO members have not to date expressed any intention to undertake combined military 
action other than small operations against terrorists—the focus of recent exercises. 
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      India’s growing energy needs and its desire to gain allies in its ongoing dispute 
with Pakistan over the Kashmir region have forced New Delhi to form new relationships 
with nations in the Central Asian region and within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.  India has been quietly increasing its presence in the Central Asian region 
over the last few years.  The Indians have established a military base in Tajikistan which 
is used to funnel humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, and they have agreed to “train Tajik 
defense personnel, service and retrofit their Soviet and Russian military equipment and 
teach its army and air force personnel English.”103 India has also agreed to assist 
Tajikistan in its fight against illegal narcotics smuggling. 
      Besides its ties with Tajikistan, India has also been seeking closer ties with other 
members of the SCO.  Kazakhstan has voiced its support for India’s inclusion in the 
SCO.  According to a joint declaration by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee 
and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev India’s membership in the SCO “would add 
to the strength of that organization.”104  
      Perhaps the strongest supporter of New Delhi’s candidacy for membership in the 
organization has been Russia.  Vladimir Putin evidently favors a China-Russia-India 
alliance and creating a “multi-polar” world, the latter desire repeatedly expressed by 
members of the SCO.  In remarks to the Indian press in December 2002, after meeting 
with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, Putin stated, “Russia and India are 
major world powers, and our manifold cooperation is a most important positive factor of 
world politics.”105  
      At the same meeting in New Delhi, President Putin assured his hosts of Russia’s 
support for India’s inclusion in the SCO and also voiced support for India’s membership 
in an expanded United Nations Security Council.  “Russia reasserts its support for India 
as a strong and worthy candidate for the position of permanent member of an enlarged 
UN Security Council.”106 The possibility of three members of the SCO occupying 
curity Council evidently looks attractive to Moscow.  The permanent seats on the UN Se                                                 
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Russian statement did not specify whether India’s permanent membership on the UN 
Security Council would include a veto power. 
      With India in the SCO, Asia’s three largest powers would be able to voice their 
opinions in a common forum.  In addition to the global and regional political 
ramifications, India’s membership in the organization would increase the number of 
nuclear weapons and add more than a million troops to the organization’s conventional 
military forces.  However, as noted earlier, it is unclear whether this would have great 
strategic significance in the absence of steps to make coordinated military action 
effective.     
      Despite India’s interest in the SCO, its strategic relationship with the United 
States has made New Delhi hesitant to join an organization which has openly voiced 
opposition to U.S policies.  India has also been wary of creating a Moscow-Beijing-New 
Delhi alliance that would ensure a “multi-polar” norm in global politics, something 
Russia and China have openly advocated.  
      Although hesitant at first, India appears ready to join the organization.  On 28 
February 2003, India’s ambassador to Russia stated, “India subscribes to all principles of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is ready to accede to it.”107 Recent 
high level bilateral talks between India and China have succeeded in stabilizing relations 
and suggest that China will likely not oppose India’s inclusion in the SCO.  Some 
observers speculated that a decision to accept India in the SCO could possibly come as 
early as May 2003 at the SCO summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan, but a decision on this issue 
was postponed. 
      Iran’s membership in the organization would dramatically affect the region’s 
political balance and would provide the organization with a direct link to the Middle East.  
China and Iran have already held discussions on a proposed oil pipeline running from  
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Iran through the Central Asian states to China.  According to China’s ambassador to Iran, 
“Iran is China’s top oil supplier.  One-sixth of China’s gasoline needs are procured 
through Iran.”108  
      Iran has also been working closely with Russia in terms of arms deals and nuclear 
reactor assistance.  Iran recently declared that its nuclear program was up and running, 
with explicit support from Russia.  Despite international scrutiny, Russian officials 
continue to assert that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and that they will continue 
“peaceful nuclear cooperation” with Iran.109 Russia’s support for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear 
project includes training Iranian workers for the nuclear plant as well as 10 years of 
uranium sales to Iran starting in 2005.110  
      Proposed natural gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia through Iran would 
provide another transport outlet for Central Asian energy resources.  The SCO would also 
give Iran a vehicle in which to voice its opposition to U.S. policies in Central Asia and 
the Middle East, with the backing of China and Russia. 
      The prospect of Pakistan’s inclusion in the organization, despite Islamabad’s 
suspected ties to radical Islamic groups, has also led to India’s hesitancy about joining the 
SCO.  In contrast with India’s hesitancy in joining the organization, Pakistan has openly 
lobbied for its inclusion in the organization as an observer.  On 3 January 2001 Pakistan’s 
ambassador to Kyrgyzstan submitted Islamabad’s request to join the organization as an 
observer.111 However, Tajikistan President, Emomali Rahmanov, protested even 
discussing Pakistan’s inclusion in the SCO because of Pakistan’s suspected ties with the 
Taliban and Islamic fundamentalists.112 
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      Russia has also voiced skepticism over Pakistan’s possible membership.  Russian 
President Vladimir Putin voiced this concern at a press conference in India in November 
2002.  “The negative influence that Pakistan used to exercise in neighboring Afghanistan 
in previous years, including support to the Taliban, is well known, it is a fact.”113 The 
rejection of Pakistan by Russia and Tajikistan will make Pakistan’s inclusion as an 
observer extremely difficult.  
      Turkmenistan’s inclusion in the SCO would not affect the political or military 
balance within the region or the organization, but it would bring another state rich in 
energy resources into the SCO.  Turkmenistan’s insistence that it is a neutral country and 
its desire to distance itself from Moscow make it unlikely that it would enter into any 
alliance involving Russia. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
      The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established out of a need to provide 
security and stability to the Central Asian region.  China and Russia, the main catalysts 
for the organization, feared that the region’s growing problems would spill across their 
borders and add to the problems they are already facing in Xinjiang province and the 
northern Caucasus region.  Both nations knew that they needed the assistance of the 
Central Asian governments to counter radical Islamic groups, secessionist movements, 
and narcotics smuggling. 
      China and Russia apparently also concluded that a multilateral organization under 
their leadership in Central Asia might help to stem the growing influence of the West, 
specifically the United States and NATO.  NATO’s activities in Central Asia via the 
Partnership for Peace program and the establishment of U.S. bases in the region since 11 
September 2001 have brought about a sense of apprehension and quiet criticism from 
Moscow and Beijing.  However, the increase in Western influence in the region was 
warmly welcomed by the Central Asian states, because they viewed the presence of the 
West in terms of added security and much needed economic aid. 
      Members of the Russian Duma and Russian military officials have been the most 
outspoken critics of U.S. policy in the Central Asian region.  They contend that the 
presence of the United States and NATO in Central Asia is an attempt to force Russia out 
of the region, gain control of the region’s energy resources, and force a wedge between 
Russia and China in the SCO.  In January 2002 the Speaker of Russia’s lower house of 
parliament, the Duma, Gennadii Seleznev, voiced his opposition to the presence of U.S. 
forces in the region.  During his visit to Tajikistan, Seleznev stated that “The long-term 
military presence of the United States in the region is not in Russia’s interests.”114 In 
February 2002 the Director of the Russian Federal Border Guard Service, Konstantine  
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Totskiy, also commented on the establishment of U.S. bases in the Central Asian region.  
“If the United States and other countries intend to stay here [i.e., in Central Asia] for 
good, we cannot agree to that.”115 
      Despite the views of some leaders of the Russian Duma and Russian military, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin evidently understands that if Russia is to grow into a 
“superpower” once again, Russia must cooperate with the West and with the United 
States in particular.  President Putin’s government also views the presence of NATO and 
U.S. forces in the Central Asian region as an added measure of security and stability that 
will allow him more time to re-build Russia’s deteriorating military.   
      President Putin’s foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, expressed this positive view of 
U.S. and NATO forces in the region during his interview with the Russian newspaper 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta in December 2002.  When questioned about U.S.-Russia relations, 
Ivanov spoke about the positive factor of U.S. forces in the Central Asian region. 
We had constantly been indicating that the threat to our interests, a real 
threat at that, was coming from the south, primarily from the territory of 
Afghanistan.  It is clear that Russia could hardly have tackled the task of 
eliminating the seat of terrorism in Afghanistan on its own, single-
handedly.  It had been accomplished by the efforts of the international 
coalition.  Have our southern borders become more secure as a result?  
Absolutely…Yes, we have to make compromises, one of them has been 
the appearance in this region of U.S., and not only U.S., servicemen who 
are solving the task connected with the international operation in 
Afghanistan.116 
 
      Moscow and Beijing also recognize the benefits in the Central Asian region of 
U.S. economic aid.  Given that a chief reason for the rapid spread of radical Islam 
throughout the region may well be the suffering economies of the Central Asian states, 
any economic aid supplied to the Central Asian governments, above what China and 
Russia already provide, can only benefit their own struggle to keep the ranks of the 
Islamic militants from swelling.   Increased economic aid to the Central Asian states 
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would also benefit Russia by slowing down the continuous flow of Central Asians 
migrating to Russia in search of employment.  
      China has evidently not openly voiced any opposition to the NATO Partnership 
for Peace program or the increase in the U.S. military presence in Central Asia.  China 
has vocally supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism since September 2001, as it looks to 
the West for support in its ongoing struggle with Uighur separatist groups, which it 
considers terrorist organizations.  China evidently judges that a defeat of terrorism in 
Central Asia would help it defeat the separatists in Xinjiang province.  Chinese leaders 
have also noted that the United States has said much less about China’s potential future 
as a “peer competitor” since Washington has concentrated on the struggle against 
terrorism since September 2001. 
      Since the U.S.-led coalition operation in Afghanistan began in October 2001, the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization has concentrated on anti-terrorist measures, notably 
with the center to be established in Tashkent in January 2004, and on the economic 
development of the member nations.  Despite the successful joint military exercises, SCO 
member states have yet to conclude a mutual defense pact and still have not shown an 
ability to conduct any type of joint military engagement larger than small-scale anti-
terrorist operations.  Emphasizing the positive achievement, Lieutenant General Qiu 
Yanhan, commander of the Xinjiang military district, said in August 2003 that the most 
recent “multilateral joint exercise has for the first time succeeded in linking up the 
multistate force from the command organs down to the participating units.”117 
      Despite earlier, pre-11 September 2001 anti-U.S. rhetoric, China and Russia have 
kept their anti-Western views muffled.  At present, both nations recognize that the 
benefits of trade and economic aid from the United States are worth more than alienating 
Washington over its policies regarding Central Asia and other matters, such as missile 
defense.  The U.S.-led war in Iraq in March-April 2003 drew sharp criticism from Russia 
while the member states of the SCO, with the exception of Uzbekistan, followed the lead 
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of Russia and China in condemning the actions of the coalition that toppled the Saddam 
Hussein regime.118 
      Uzbek President Islam Karimov has highlighted the potential fracture points 
within the SCO, should Moscow and Beijing exert excessive pressures for conformity on 
the Central Asian states:   
The first issue is opposing views on the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, and the problem of globalization in the world.  That is, 
somebody joins some bloc or comes under its wing, or some bloc says it is 
not happy about something.  Such games should be stopped…If we allow 
such competition, what will happen tomorrow?  What will entire Central 
Asia turn into?  Not one but 10 [military] bases will be established.  And 
that means militarization.  I am absolutely against it, and I want to be the 
first to express my thoughts.119 
 
      Despite the recent tensions over Iraq and the apparent uneasiness in Beijing and 
Moscow about U.S. forces operating from Central Asian bases, as long as the United 
States continues to maintain its position that U.S. bases in Central Asia are only 
temporary, China and Russia will probably continue to support the U.S.-led war on 
terrorism in Central Asia and will avoid any form of conflict with NATO or the United 
States. 
      After a slow start, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is rapidly gaining 
institutional structure and international recognition.  A multinational center dedicated to 
the main function of the organization, anti-terrorism, is to be operational in Tashkent by 
early 2004.  Economic and trade ties have also been developing rapidly through the SCO 
and the effects are already being felt in the local economies of the Central Asian states.   
      The SCO has the potential to develop into a key player in international politics, 
and India’s membership might dramatically increase the organization’s influence on 
future international political decisions, not only in Asia but also within the United 
Nations.  In the near term, however, the SCO will probably concentrate on Central Asia 
while it continues to develop its organizational structure.  Indeed, as long as the threat 
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from an unstable Central Asia outweighs the threat from abroad, the SCO will in all 
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